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NOTES 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-Protective Jurisdiction and 
Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring 
Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions 
"Consumer protection" has come of age. The heightened appre-
ciation of the consumer's plight has not been matched, however, by 
an equal commi~ment to providing effective programs for vindicating 
his cause.1 As a practical matter the consumer may be unable to assert 
his rights. Suits to enforce consumer rights are costly and are not likely 
to be brought when each individual claim is counted only in the 
tens of dollars. 2 
It was in response to this obstacle to effective enforcement of 
consumer rights that Senator Joseph Tydings introduced the Class 
Action Jurisdiction Act (S. 1980) in the Senate on April 25, 1969.3 
The aim of this legislation was to make a class action available to 
consumer-plaintiffs so that they might share the costs of litigation. 
Significantly, the bill provided that the forum for this class action 
was to be the federal court system,4 where the liberal requirements of 
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apply.5 
l. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Efjective 
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966), for a survey of the impediments 
to a consumer's assertion of his rights. See also Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures 
and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. R.Ev. 559 (1968), and 
Tydings, The Private Bar-Untapped Reservoir of Consumer Power, 45 NOTRE DAME 
I.Aw. 478 (1970). 
2. See Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures Before 
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970) (statement of Hon. Bob Eckhardt). 
3. S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. R.Ec. 10,460-61 (1969). 
4. As used in this Note, the term "federal courts" will refer only to those courts 
esablished pursuant to and under U.S. CoNsT. art. III. ''Legislative" courts established 
under U.S. CONST. art. I powers present special problems that will not be considered 
in this Note. 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 provides in part: 
{a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of 
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
{b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class 
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of 
the class would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of 
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party 
opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would 
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties 
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
[ 710] 
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Indeed, it would seem that the grant of federal jurisdiction was 
solely intended as a means to the real end of the bill-to provide 
access to the federal class-action rule.6 More important, under the 
proposed legislation federal jurisdiction could be invoked even 
though the action itself arose under state substantive law and there 
was no diversity of citizenship between the litigants. The pertinent 
section of the bill read: 
(b) The district court shall have original jurisdiction, regardless 
of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, of 
civil class actions brought by one or more consumers or potential 
consumers of goods, services, realty, or intangibles on behalf of them-
selves and all other consumers similarly situated, where-
(!) the action involves the violation of consumers' rights under 
State or Federal statutory or decisional law for the benefit of con-
sumers ...• 7 
Thus, federal jurisdiction would result whenever a state-or federal 
-consumer claim was asserted. 
To justify this apparent expansion of the jurisdiction of article 
III courts beyond diversity and federal-question cases,8 Senator 
Tydings maintained that Congress might give federal courts juris-
diction to adjudicate state law claims "which arise in areas subject to 
congressional regulation.''9 Presumably the Senator was referring to 
the theory of "protective jurisdiction,"10 although his rationale was 
never clearly articulated as such.11 
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members 
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and 
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and ef-
ficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings in-
clude: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members 
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action. 
6. Senator Tydings himself admitted that the bill was "designed to counterbalance 
restrictive State attitudes toward consumer class actions ••.• " ll5 CoNG. REc. 10,460 
(1969). He continued: "Federal court jurisdiction makes available the refinements of 
contemporary Federal court practice, including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the 
most modern class action procedure in the United States." Id. 
7. S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(l) (1969), reprinted in ll5 CONG. REc. 10,460-61 
(1969). 
8. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
9. 115 CONG. REc. 10,460 (1969). 
10. For an explanation of protective jurisdiction, see notes 26-28 infra and ac-
companying text. 
11. This presumption grows stronger in light of the authority that Senator Tydings 
cited, which included Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 
COLUM. L. REv. 157, 184-96 (1953), the classic statement of the protective-jurisdiction 
theory. 115 CONG. REc. 10,460 (1969). 
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This lack of clarity regarding the theoretical basis of S. 1980 has 
in part been obviated by the introduction of a new bill by Senator 
Tydings on October 29, 1969-the Consumer Class Action Act (S. 
3092).12 The approach for conferring federal jurisdiction in the new 
bill differs markedly from that of the original bill. The protective-
jurisdiction rationale has been replaced by a forthright adoption of 
state consumer laws as federal law.13 But to all appearances the ulti-
mate goal of S. 3092 remains the same as that of S. 1980: to provide 
consumer-plaintiffs access to the federal class-action rule.14 The 
language of the new bill can be explained as an attempt to avoid any 
constitutional problems that protective jurisdiction might present 
by shrouding the entire exercise in the cloak of adoption.15 If, as has 
been suggested, the adoption technique is being employed to achieve 
the same end that the protective-jurisdiction theory was intended to 
accomplish in the earlier bill, at least two questions are suggested. 
Would the earlier bill itself have been constitutionally valid? If not, 
can adoption be used to reach an end that could not constitution-
12. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 32,141-42 (1969). This 
new bill was prompted by the suggestion of Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the 
President for Consumer Affairs, that a class action be made available to consumers to 
seek damages for unfair or deceptive practices as defined under § 5(a)(l) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964). 115 CONG, REc. 32,142 
(1969). (remarks of Senator Tydings). As a result, the first section of the bill addresses 
itself to providing this class action under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The 
second part of the proposed Act, however, is concerned exclusively with federal class-
action jurisdiction for suits arising under state consumer law; in this regard it parallels 
the earlier Tydings bill. 
13. The relevant sections of the new bill provide: 
SEc. 4. (a)(l) An act in defraud of consumers which affects commerce is unlaw-
ful and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction 
without regard to the amount in controversy to entertain civil class actions for 
redress of such unlawful acts. 
(2) For the purposes of this section an "act in defraud of consumers" is-
(B) an act that gives rise to a civil action by a consumer or consumers 
under State statutory or decisional law for the benefit of consumers. 
(c) In the case of any class action brought upon the basis of a violation of 
consumers' rights under any State law the court shall, in deciding such action, 
apply the following criteria: 
(1) State law relating to the consumers' rights under State statutory or 
decisional law is adopted as Federal law. 
(2) Federal law applicable to each case shall be fashioned upon the law of 
the State and the State statutory and decisional construction shall be applied as 
if jurisdiction of the Federal court were based on diversity of citizenship. 
S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969), reprinted in 115 CoNG. REc. 32,142 (1969). Sec-
tion 4(a) incorporates state consumer laws in the definition of "an act in defraud of 
consumers" and thus in the definition of the federal cause of action. Section 4(c)(l) 
provides that in such causes of action the state law is adopted as federal law. 
14. See 115 CoNG. REc. 32,142 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
15. See Letter to the Hon. Robert C. Eckhardt from Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr., 
May 27, 1969, reprinted in Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection 
Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1970). For a discussion of the 
theory of adoption, see notes 127-31 infra and accompanying text. 
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ally be reached by use of a theory of protective jurisdiction? The con-
stitutionality of S. 3092 depends upon answers to these questions.16 
The traditional view of federal-court jurisdiction maintains that 
inferior federal courts can exercise jurisdiction only when it is con-
ferred by Congress and that congressional power to confer jurisdic-
tion is, in turn, limited by the restrictions of article III of the 
Constitution.17 Thus, article III has been viewed as the exclusive 
source of judicial power and hence the power of the federal courts.18 
This traditional view, however, has been questioned on occasion. 
Perhaps the most notable discussion of article III limitations on 
federal-court jurisdiction came in National Mutual Insurance Com-
pany v. Tidewater Transfer Company.19 In that case, Justice Jackson, 
joined by Justices Black and Burton, argued that Congress might 
expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts when it thought that 
such an expansion was necessary and proper in order to implement 
Congress' article I power over the District of Columbia.20 However, 
16. S. 3092 and the companion bill introduced in the House (H.R. 14585, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. (1969)) are in the Commerce Committees of the respective bodies. The 
Administration has also introduced a bill in both Houses to provide a class action for 
consumers under the Federal Trade Commission Act. S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 
H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For a discussion of the progress of these bills in 
the committees, see Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NoTRE DAME LAW. 663 (1970). 
17. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
The history of the adoption and ratification of the Constitution demonstrates that 
there was strong sentiment at that time to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts as 
much as possible. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 
628-38 (1949) (Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting). Responding to this concern, Alexander 
Hamilton '\\Tote: "The amount of the observations hitherto made on the authority of 
the judicial department is this: that it has been carefully restricted to those causes 
which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national judicature •.. .'' THE 
F.rnERAusr No. 81, at 353 (C. Beard ed. 1948) (Hamilton). 
18. See the concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge and the dissenting opinions of 
Chief Justice Vinson and of Justice Frankfurter in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater 
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604, 626, 646 (1949). 
19. 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Tidewater arose as a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Act of April 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1964), 
which granted to the federal district courts original jurisdiction over suits "between 
citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Columbia •.•• " The Supreme 
Court had long before held in Hepburn &: Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 
(1805), that a citizen of the District of Columbia is not a citizen of a state within the 
meaning of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Act of Sept. 24, 
1789, ch. 20, § 11, I Stat. 73, 78). Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Burton and Black, 
declined to overturn this interpretation of article III. Nonetheless, they were able to 
uphold the statute as "a reasonable exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to 
legislate for the District of Columbia and for the Territories ••• ," under U.S. CoNsT. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 337 U.S. at 588-89. 
20. 377 U.S. at 588-600. Professor Mishkin characterized this approach in the 
following way: 
[The federal-question clause] would not then be the exclusive source of judicial 
power for the national courts; rather it would be merely a reference over to the 
legislative authority granted Congress by Article I of the Constitution. On this 
theory, it is the total legislative power, and not Article III, which provides the 
source-and thus the measure-of federal question jurisdiction. 
Mishkin, supra note 11, at 190. 
714 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69 
six members of the Court expressly rejected Justice Jackson's argu-
ment and reaffirmed the traditional view that article III expresses 
the full measure of federal judicial power.21 
While re-emphasizing the role of article III as a limitation on 
federal judicial power, the Tidewater decision, because of the wide 
divergence among the Justices on the theories of federal-court juris-
diction, did little to resolve the difficulties implicit in an attempt to 
define the scope of article III itself. Indeed, the effect of the decision 
may have been to compound the difficulties, for now it is necessary 
to subsume the apparent aberration of the bankruptcy cases22 under 
article III alone. In those cases, the Court upheld section 23 of 
the Bankruptcy Act,23 which permits trustees in bankruptcy to bring 
certain state-created causes of action in federal courts irrespective of 
diversity of citizenship. Justice Jackson read the bankruptcy cases as 
authority for his article I proposition in Tidewater,24 while two of 
the Justices who disagreed with that proposition attempted to justify 
the bankruptcy jurisdiction in terms of article III considerations.25 
Perhaps to explain the aberrational nature of the bankruptcy 
cases or perhaps simply to lend some flexibility to the otherwise rigid 
confines of article III, several writers have developed the thesis of 
protective jurisdiction.26 Characterized by one commentator as "a 
more subtle theory" to reach the same result that Justice Jackson 
argued for in Tidewater,27 protective jurisdiction would permit the 
expansion of federal-court jurisdiction while still purporting to 
observe the dictates of article III. More precisely, under the theory 
Congress could grant jurisdiction to the federal courts over matters 
in which there is a federal interest to be protected.28 
The several variants of the protective-jurisdiction theory, al-
though differing slightly, all attempt to justify protective jurisdiction 
21. Justices Rutledge and Murphy, although concurring in the Court's judgment, 
expressly rejected Justice Jackson's argument. 337 U.S. at 607-17. Chief Justice Vinson, 
joined by Justice Douglas, and Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Reed, in dissent, 
also flatly rejected the Jackson argument. 337 U.S. at 628-45, 646-52. 
22. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 
(1934). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 42-47 infra and accompanying text. 
23. 11 u.s.c. § 46 (1964). 
24. 337 U.S. at 594-600. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
25. 337 U.S. at 611-15 ijustice Rutledge, concurring), 652 ijustice Frankfurter, 
dissenting). 
26. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 184-96; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the 
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 224-25 (1948). 
27. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS§ 20, at 66 (2d ed. 1970). 
28. Thus, for example, in the Tidewater case protective jurisdiction would f~nction 
to legitimate the federal-court jurisdiction because there is a federal interest in the 
affairs of the citizens of the District of Columbia, as evidenced by the article I power 
to legislate for the District. The proponents of the several variants of the protective-
jurisdiction theory differ in their determinations of what the federal interests are that 
can be protected by federal jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 55-66 infra. 
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in terms of federal-question jurisdiction. One variant suggests that 
the statute granting the protective jurisdiction is itself the law of the 
United States under which the case arises.29 Another variant main-
tains that the power to make the jurisdictional grant derives from and 
arises under the federal laws previously enacted in the same general 
area.30 Both variants of the theory involve a considerable expansion 
of the traditional meaning of the article III words, "arising under ... 
the Laws of the United States."31 Most frequently, when courts have 
addressed themselves to the meaning of these words, they have in 
fact been interpreting the nearly identical statutory language that 
confers original jurisdiction upon the federal district courts.32 It has 
been recognized that the statutory meaning of the words "arising 
under" is perhaps not as broad as the constitutional meaning of these 
same words.33 Therefore, the fact that the protective-jurisdiction 
theories would expand the traditional meaning of "arising under" 
does not necessarily militate against the constitutionality of the 
theories. But it must still be demonstrated that the definition of 
"arising under" proposed in the protective-jurisdiction theories falls 
within the constitutional-as opposed to the stricter statutory-
meaning of that phrase. 
Proponents of protective jurisdiction argue that the power of 
Congress to protect federal interests justifies an expanded definition 
of the term "arising under."34 There is in fact some case authority, 
29. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 225. 
30. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 192·96. 
31. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a survey of the traditional interpretations of 
"arising under," see Gully v. First Natl. Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964). See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 
337 U.S. 582, 613-15 (1949) CTustice Rutledge, concurring). 
33. The statutory language has not usually been given'as liberal a construction by 
the courts and commentators as the constitutional grant. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. 
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900); Mishkin, supra note 11, at 160-63. Cf. Forrester, The 
Nature of a "Federal Question", 16 TuL. L. R.Ev. 362 (1942). 
34. As an analogue to this congressional power to protect federal interests, one 
commentator has pointed to the diversity jurisdiction provided in article III itself and 
to other classes of litigants that have been given access to federal jurisdiction by article 
III. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Mishkin, supra note 11, at 185. These clauses of article 
III appear to legitimate the use of federal-court jurisdiction for protective purposes. 
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 49, 82-83 (1923), which maintained that the "chief and only real reason" for 
diversity jurisdiction was to protect litigants from state court prejudices. Compare that 
view with Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. R.Ev. 483, 
495.97 (1928), which suggested that a more important reason for establishing diversity 
jurisdiction was to protect creditors from state legislatures that favored debtors. Under 
either view, the framers intended federal jurisdiction to protect classes of litigants 
from state prejudices. 
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475 (1957), 
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, questioned whether these clauses exhausted the framers' 
intent on the protective use of the federal courts. If they did, application of the protec-
tive principle to the federal-question clause of article III would be precluded. There is 
no logical reason why this should be so, however. It could be persuasively argued that 
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equivocal though it may be, for the proposition that the Constitution 
recognizes the exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to protect federal 
interests. The proponents of this proposition rely heavily on the 
early case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States,85 the only case in 
which the Supreme Court has explicitly construed the scope of the 
constitutional phrase "arising under." The Osborn decision cut a 
wide swath for that provision. The case arose in the context of a suit 
by the Bank of the United States to enjoin the collection of a state 
tax levied upon it. At issue, at least as Chief Justice Marshall viewed 
the case, was the constitutionality of the act that incorporated the 
Bank and gave it the right to sue or be sued in every circuit court of 
the United States.86 As the companion case to Osborn indicated,87 
this right to sue in the federal courts would obtain even though the 
particular cause of action was created by state law and only state law 
would govern the outcome. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall up-
held federal jurisdiction as falling within the federal-question clause 
of article III since questions concerning the validity of the incorpora-
tion, the ability of the Bank to sue in contract, and the like, would 
necessarily arise in any state law cause of action.88 The Chief Justice 
thus deemed the federal incorporation act an "original ingredient" of 
any case to whic;h the Bank was a party, and he concluded that any 
such case would therefore arise under that act.39 
Although Chief Justice Marshall explained the result in Osborn 
solely in terms of constitutional exegesis, the concern of the Court 
went beyond mere fidelity to the text of the Constitution. Justice 
Johnson, in his dissenting opinion in Osborn, made explicit the con-
cern that may have compelled the Court to its decision: state animos-
ity toward the Bank rendered "all the protection necessary, that the 
general government can give to this Bank."40 In light of this situation, 
the Osborn decision might be interpreted as an attempt to protect 
the form of protection codified in the diversity clause, i.e., protection of a class of 
litigants from foreign and presumably unfriendly forums, represents but one branch of 
a genus-protective jurisdiction-the other branch being protection of federal interests 
to be implied under the federal-question clause. Under this analysis, the codification of 
one branch in explicit clauses of article III would only preclude the expansion of that 
same branch; it need not prevent the recognition of the other branch that is not 
explicitly codified. Logically, then, the recognition of protective jurisdiction under the 
diversity clause of article III would not seem to militate either for or against the ap-
plication of protective jurisdiction under the federal-question clause. 
35. 22 U.S. (9 "Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
36. Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 269. 
37. In Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), 
the Bank of the United States sued in federal court under state law to recover on 
negotiable notes made by a state bank. 
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823-24. 
39. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 824. 
40. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871-72. 
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the Bank in all its legal relations-particularly those governed by 
state law in which federal appellate review could not redress subtle 
discriminations.41 Thus construed, the Osborn decision would be an 
endorsement of the concept of protective jurisdiction. 
The proponents of protective jurisdiction also cite the Bankruptcy 
Act and, more specifically, its provisions for trustee suits (section 23)42 
as further authority for the proposition that the federal courts may 
exercise jurisdiction in order to protect federal interests. The Su-
preme Court has upheld the constitutionality of section 23,43 which 
sets forth instances when a trustee may invoke federal jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a private cause of action based on state law.44 Although 
there is some language in these cases stating that Congress could 
confer such jurisdiction by virtue of its article I power over bank-
ruptcy,45 these decisions might better be explained in terms of the 
explicit Osborn rationale: the federal bankruptcy laws are original 
ingredients that would exist and could be questioned in any trustee 
suit.46 Nevertheless, it can be extrapolated from these bankruptcy 
cases that one function of the federal courts is to protect at least one 
type of federal interest even in state law cases.47 
At least one court, in Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead,48 has found 
sufficient authority in this meager precedent to sustain protective 
jurisdiction. Yet even if one assumes that the Osborn decision and 
the bankruptcy cases provide some constitutional basis for the 
exercise of protective jurisdiction, the scope of this jurisdiction re-
mains unclear. Failure to delineate the interests susceptible of pro-
41. Mishkin, supra note II at 187. 
42. 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1964), provides: 
(a) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies 
at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings under this title, between 
receivers and trustees as such and adverse claimants, concerning the property ac-
quired or claimed by the receivers or trustees, in the same manner and to the 
same extent as though such proceedings had not been instituted and such con-
troversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants. 
(b) Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in 
the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if pro-
ceedings under this title had not been instituted, unless by consent of the defen-
dant, except as provided in sections 96, 107 and 110 of this title. 
43. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 
(1934). 
44. See note 42 supra. 
45. See Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934), in which the Court stated 
that "[t]he Congress, by virtue of its constitutional authority over bankruptcies, could 
confer or withhold jurisdiction to entertain such suits and prescribe the conditions 
upon which the federal courts should have jurisdiction." 
46. For an analysis of the bankruptcy cases in terms of federal-question jurisdiction, 
see Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in the Tidewater case, 337 U.S. at 611-15. 
47. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195. 
48. 230 F.2d 576, 580-81 (1st Cir. 1956). See also the concurring opinion of Justice 
Burton in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 459-60 
(1957). 
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tection renders the bounds of protective jurisdiction vague. As 
discussed below,49 it may well be that the validity of the exercise of 
such jurisdiction will depend upon its breadth. The several pro-
ponents of protective jurisdiction have defined the scope of the 
jurisdiction differently. Not all of the proposals are equally persuasive 
in constitutional terms.50 In the one decision that has upheld the 
concept of protective jurisdiction, the court itself noted the ambigui-
ties that exist concerning the parameters of protective jurisdiction, 
but did not feel compelled to define these limits since, in its judgment, 
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act51-the statute under considera-
tion-clearly fell within the constitutional bounds of protective 
jurisdiction.52 Accordingly, the court failed to articulate a test for the 
constitutional bounds of protective jurisdiction.53 The applicability 
of an argument based on protective jurisdiction to the Taft-Hartley 
Act has, of course, been subsequently rendered moot, since the Act 
has been construed by the Supreme Court as a mandate to the federal 
courts to develop a corpus of federal common law to govern section 
301 actions.54 Thus, there appears to be no authoritative judicial 
guidance with respect to the precise constitutional limits of protective 
jurisdiction. Therefore, an essentially independent determination 
of the constitutionality of protective jurisdiction must be made. In 
order to accomplish this, the bounds of each of the proposals will be 
scrutinized to determine whether any or all fall within the constitu-
tional limits of article III. 
The proposal that sets the broadest bounds suggests that protec-
tive jurisdiction extends to any case that involves facts about which 
the Congress might legislate under the Constitution. Under this 
thesis, Congress could provide for federal jurisdiction over the state 
law claims of a trustee in bankruptcy simply because Congress has a 
general legislative power over bankruptcy. Professor Mishkin, in 
describing this theory, has stated, "[S]o long as the interest is of the 
49. See notes 67-75 infra and accompanying text. 
50. See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra. 
51. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301, ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 156, as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). 
52. Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 230 F.2d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1956). 
53. The court in Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead did note that the subject matter 
of § 301 was one over which Congress had undisputed power and, moreover, that 
Congress had actually exercised its regulatory power in the form of legislative enact-
ments that prescribed certain rules to be applied in § 301 cases. 230 F.2d at 581. Pre-
sumably the latter fact was more persuasive to the court since the opinion in Mead 
placed particular emphasis on the possibility that a federal court would be called 
upon to apply federal substantive rules in deciding a § 301 case. 230 F.2d at 581-82. 
The potential involvement of federal law appears to be the touchstone of the court's 
judgment that the protective jurisdiction of § 301 was a constitutional exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
54. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
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kind described, it is of no concern whether the particular case be one 
as to which Congress might have enacted the substantive rule."55 
Congress has a general interest in the field of bankruptcy; a provision 
for federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases is one way of protecting 
this interest. 
The approach to protective jurisdiction outlined above should be 
distinguished from the approach that suggests that congressional 
power to confer jurisdiction extends only to the particular cases over 
which Congress has legislative power to make dispositive rules.56 
Professor Herbert Wechsler formulated the classic statement of this 
position.57 'While his analysis does not speak explicitly in terms of a 
"federal interest" to be protected, his theory would, in effect, operate 
to protect the federal interest in overseeing these types of cases. En-
dorsing Chief Justice Marshall's position in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States that the federal judicial power must extend to every 
case that might involve an issue under federal law or the Constitu-
tion, 58 '\Vechsler's analysis goes further: 
It [judicial power] should extend, I think, beyond this to all cases 
in which Congress has authority to make the rule to govern dis-
position of the controversy but is content instead to let the states 
provide the rule so long as jurisdiction to enforce it has been vested 
in a federal court.1>0 
In cases in which Congress could prescribe the substantive law for 
the case, Congress should, according to the Wechsler thesis, have the 
option of a lower-level involvement, i.e., retaining jurisdiction over 
the case while permitting the states to frame the applicable law. 
Other commentators have supported this underlying policy of avoid-
ing full displacement of state law.60 
The Wechsler thesis is not without its problems, however. It has 
been pointed out that the Osborn decision and the bankruptcy cases, 
55. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 188. Professor Mishkin describes this as one possible 
approach, but does not cite any authorities who have forwarded such a proposition. C. 
WRIGHT, supra note 27, § 20, at 66 n.2, suggests that Professor Wechsler's theory allows 
protective jurisdiction "wherever Congress has substantive legislative power." The 
subsequent development of Wechsler's thesis appears to justify this characterization. 
Sec text accompanying note 63 infra. 
56. J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 138 (1949) appears to support 
this position, stating that "if Congress can validly legislate concerning a matter it may 
constitutionally confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts of any claim arising within 
the ambit of that legislative power." 
57. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 224-25. 
58. Sec text accompanying notes 35.39 supra. 
59. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 224. 
60. See Bickel &: Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The 
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. I, 19-21 (1957). These authors state that "(i]t would 
be regrettable for Congress to be forced instead to exert its authority to the full in 
order to be able to employ it at all." Id. at 20-21. 
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if they do indeed lend support to the idea of protective jurisdiction, 
would presumably extend federal-court jurisdiction to cases beyond 
the actual legislative competence of Congress.61 For example, it is 
doubtful that Congress could have prescribed rules for every case in 
which suit was brought by or against the Bank of the United States. 
These cases, therefore, suggest a wider scope for protective jurisdic-
tion than originally envisaged by Professor Wechsler. 
Perhaps to answer this criticism, Professor Wechsler broadened 
his original thesis of protective jurisdiction. In discussing the Tide-
water case, 62 Professors Wechsler and Hart appear to maintain that 
even if it is assumed that Congress has no power to enact substantive 
law governing the relations between residents of the District of 
Columbia and residents of the other states, Congress still might confer 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to protect the District's citizens 
from the possibility of discrimination in state forums.63 The Wechs-
ler thesis in this expanded form approaches more nearly the strain 
of protective jurisdiction that is the basis of the diversity clauses-
namely, the protection of a class of litigants from discrimination in 
foreign state courts. The thesis might be distinguished from Justice 
Jackson's opinion in Tidewater only in the sense that the protection 
of the class of litigants there-District residents-comes in the 
context of an explicit article I power to legislate for the District. Yet, 
this distinction is of no consequence because Tidewater itself 
indicates that article I cannot be used to expand article III jurisdic-
tion. 64 
The difficulty with assuming that it is simply such a class of liti-
gants that the grant of protective jurisdiction is to shelter is that this 
branch of protective jurisdiction may well have been exhausted in 
the diversity clauses of article III. 65 Although the Hart and Wechsler 
thesis explains the assertion of protective jurisdiction in the Tide-
water case on the basis of a class of litigants to be protected, that 
thesis probably should not be read so narrowly. It is the existence of 
a federal interest that gives Congress a special expertise in the area, 
and not simply the presence of a class of litigants, that provides the 
basis for the Hart and Wechsler approach to protective jurisdiction.66 
Since protection of a class of litigants is not the touchstone on which 
Hart and 1,Vechsler base their theory of protective jurisdiction, an 
objection to the use of the Tidewater case as an example of such 
61. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 189. 
62. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text. 
63. H. HART &: H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsrEM 370-72 
(1953). 
64. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
65. See note 34 supra. 
66. See H. HART 8: H. WECHSLER, supra note 63, at 745. 
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jurisdiction is an objection only to one application of the thesis and 
not to its basic rationale. 
The exercise of protective jurisdiction, whether over a general 
area of congressional competence, over particular cases within the 
congressional lawmaking ambit, or over classes of litigants, will still 
require a relation back to the federal-question clause of article III. 
That is to say, the case over which protective jurisdiction is to be 
exercised must in some sense "arise under" the Constitution or the 
laws of the United States. It can be argued that the statute that grants 
the protective jurisdiction is itself the law under which the case 
arises. 67 The circularity of this suggestion is made more palatable by 
the reminder that the "arising under" clause would not be eliminated 
as a control upon federal jurisdiction. 68 The jurisdictional statute 
would satisfy the "arising under" requirement only when it proceeded 
from one of the enumerated heads of legislative power in article I of 
the Constitution. However, this argument is similar to that proffered 
by Justice Jackson in the Tidewater decision.69 It is the functional, 
if not the semantic, equivalent of Justice Jackson's article I ra-
tionale-a rationale that failed to sway a majority of the Court.70 The 
above approach to protective jurisdiction must, then, be viewed as 
constitutionally suspect. 
At least one theory of protective jurisdiction has been suggested 
that would relate the federal interest to be protected more satisfac-
torily to the federal-question clause. Professor Mishkin has developed 
a theory that posits congressional legislative programs in a particular 
area as the interests that may be protected under the rubric of pro-
tective jurisdiction.71 Not every article I area would be appropriate 
for protective jurisdiction; the only appropriate areas would be those 
in which Congress already had an "articulated and active federal 
policy"72 as evidenced by statutory enactments. Under this theory, it 
is the federal policy as reflected in the legislative program rather than 
67. Wechsler, supra note 26, at 224. See also Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 230 F.2d 
576, 581 (1st Cir. 1956). 
68. Bickel&: Wellington, supra note 60, at 21. 
69. See notes 19·20 supra and accompanying text. 
70. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Justice Jackson's opinion differs from 
this analysis only in that he demonstrated less compunction to justify the results in 
terms of federal-question jurisdiction. He went directly to article I for his justification. 
See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 596-99 (1949). 
71. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 192-96. While the Mishkin article is the best known 
exposition of this approach, Professor Forrester dealt with a similar suggestion several 
years earlier. See Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 
LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 114, 129-30 (1948), in which Forrester analyzed the Taft-Hartley 
Act in terms of a federal legislative program as an entity to be protected in much the 
same way as the Bank of the United States was to be protected in the Osborn case. See 
text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
72. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 192. 
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the immediate litigants that protective jurisdiction is meant to 
protect.73 By defining the protectible interests in terms of existing 
legislative programs, Mishkin's thesis attempts to justify the protec-
tion given as "arising under" the laws of the United States-those laws 
being the previously enacted legislative programs. This approach to 
protective jurisdiction has the added advantage of permitting these 
jurisdictional grants only when there is in fact some concrete interest 
to be protected. This can be contrasted with the Wechsler theory that 
would allow Congress to confer jurisdiction over any area or case 
simply because it falls within an article I power-a less concrete 
interest unless one asumes that the real object of the protection in 
such a case is the litigant and not the unexercised legislative power.74 
Thus, of all the variants of protective jurisdiction, the Mishkin 
thesis appears to come closest to satisfying the words and the intent of 
the Constitution.75 This is not to say that the approach does not have 
its faults. One major question that remains unresolved within the 
Mishkin thesis is whether the justification for the exercise of protec-
tive jurisdiction is to be found in the fact that aspects of the federal 
legislative program may become involved in a state law action. I£ 
this is the justification, proponents of Mishkin's theory would argue 
that the federal courts should have jurisdiction to guarantee that the 
federal law is faithfully and consistently construed.76 
This appears to be the argument that Judge Magruder made in 
the Mead decision, although his emphasis was somewhat differently 
placed.77 Judge Magruder viewed actions under section 301 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act as suits in which "to an important extent" the courts 
would be obliged to apply federal rules in determining the con-
troversy.78 He added that Congress might then leave the rules in 
residual areas to be "ascertained and applied in accordance with 
state law."79 The involvement of federal law need not be as great as 
it would have been in the Taft-Hartley cases as envisioned by Judge 
Magruder. Even in a suit governed on the whole by state law, the 
possible involvement of some federal law might be a sufficient 
ground on which to exercise federal protective jurisdiction. 
73. Id. at 195-96. 
74. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra. 
75. See Forrester, supra note 71, at 118-20, 129-30. 
76. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), in which the 
Supreme Court held that the grounds for federal-question jurisdiction must appear on 
the face of the plaintiff's complaint, should not preclude this exercise of jurisdiction 
since the Mottley requirement is statutory rather than constitutional. See notes 32-33 
supra and accompanying text. The Osborn decision defines the parameters of the con-
stitutional words, "arising under ••• the Laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. 
art. Ill, § 2. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
77. Teamsters Local 25 v. Mead, 230 F.2d 576, 581-83 (1st Cir. 1956). 
78. 230 F.2d at 581. 
79. 230 F.2d at 581·82. 
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This regard for the interstitial aspects of federal law in state law 
cases is not a new one. Indeed, viewed in these terms, protective 
jurisdiction is simply a restatement of Chief Justice Marshall's in-
terpretation in Osborn of the federal-question clause: a question of 
the Bank's validity and powers would arise in every case to which the 
Bank was a party-hence federal jurisdiction should attach.80 The 
Mishkin thesis thus construed would differ from Chief Justice Mar-
shall's rationale only in that the former would not require that the 
possibly interstitial federal law be an original ingredient of the case 
as well. In the Osborn case, the existence of the Bank depended upon 
federal law which became, in a sense, the but-for cause of the state 
cause of action. The exercise of protective jurisdiction, on the other 
hand, would be based only on the interstitial aspects of federal law in 
the area. 
The Mishkin theory can be interpreted in another way, however. 
Under this second reading, it is not the interstitial possibilities that 
prompt federal jurisdiction; rather, the important consideration is 
simply a desire to utilize the federal courts for the adjudication of 
cases that fall within areas in which Congress has expressed some 
legislative policy. The test for protective jurisdiction would still be 
the existence of a legislative program and policy in the field. Under 
this second interpretation of the Mishkin thesis, however, it would 
not be necessary to demonstrate that the federal laws expressing that 
policy or program would become implicated in the state law case. The 
purpose of protective jurisdiction under this interpretation is not to 
protect the federal laws as such, but to guarantee that the case is 
heard in the forum that is most sympathetic to the general concerns 
and broad contours behind the federal policy.81 This approach ob-
viously runs counter to the traditional notion of protective jurisdic-
tion embodied in the diversity clause. That notion is one of protec-
tion for litigants from a hostile forum in a foreign state-not one of 
protection for litigants from their own state courts.82 This distinction 
creates no problem, however, if it is assumed, as was suggested 
80. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra. 
81. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195, states: 
Even in cases where no specific statutory provision is itself involved, the overall 
federal policy thus may nonetheless be better protected if all connected litigation 
is adjudicated by courts well versed in, and receptive to, the national policies es-
tablished by the legislation. 
Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Textile Workers Union of America v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 476 (1956), construed the Mishkin thesis as not based upon 
the interstitial formula. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter commented: 
Professor Mishkin's theory of "protective jurisdiction" may find more constitutional 
justification if there is not merely an "articulated and active" congressional policy 
regulating the labor field, but also federal rights existing in the interstices of actions 
under § 301 [of the Taft-Hartley Act]. 
353 U.S. at 476-77. 
82. See note 34 supra. 
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earlier,83 that there are two forms of protective jurisdiction: protec-
tion for certain classes of litigants, as is the case in diversity jurisdic-
tion; and protection for the federal interest in legislative programs, 
as may be implied in the federal-question clause. While the appli-
cability of the first form might be limited to cases in which litigants 
appear before foreign forums, the protection of a federal policy would 
seem necessary even when a litigant is before his own forum. 84 
The most important question about the Mishkin theory that 
remains unresolved is whether the theory will prove persuasive 
enough to convince the Supreme Court of its constitutionality. As 
indicated above,85 when construed as an interstitial theory, the Mish-
kin thesis comes very close to the theory on which the Osborn case 
was based. The theoretical difference of "original ingredient" exists, 
but in terms of the significance and number of federal questions that 
might be raised, this difference may well be of no practical im-
portance. This may be slightly less true under the second interpreta-
tion of the Mishkin theory,86 but even under that interpretation it 
seems probable that a substantial number of federal questions 
will arise. Thus, the expansion of "arising under" to at least the 
interstitial interpretation of Mishkin's theory would seem to be 
justified as a practical matter. And the Court may be more willing to 
permit this expansion if significant federal interests are in strong 
need of protection. On the other hand, considerations such as the 
traditional judicial reluctance to expand federal jurisdiction and 
notions of federalism and comity might well lead the Court to reject 
the Mishkin theory entirely. At the very least, these are some of the 
more crucial factors that must be resolved in deciding the constitu-
tionality of protective jurisdiction, and in view of the scarcity of 
authoritative judicial guidance, further speculation concerning what 
decision the Court might make on this issue does not seem valuable. 
The first consumer class-action act proposed by Senator Tydings, 
S. 198t,,87 would fall within the bounds of protective jurisdiction 
83. Id. 
84. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 184, envisions that this protection could be attained 
by exploiting the institutional differences between the federal and state courts. As an 
example, he cites the possibility that federal judges might view the facts of a case more 
sympathetically than might state judges. Since the outcome of a particular case might 
well be different according to the forum in which it is heard, the purpose of protective 
jurisdiction in Mishkin's scheme is at odds with the policy expressed by the Supreme 
Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), of eliminating differences in 
the application of the governing state substantive law. Mishkin notes the existence of 
this policy (Mishkin, supra note 11, at 185), but fails to address himself to the incon-
sistency of his thesis with it. 
85. See text accompanying note 80 supra. 
86. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text. 
87. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text. 
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as defined by several of the above theories. Under the broadest ap-
proach,88 it could be maintained that Congress, by virtue of its com-
merce powers, could enact substantive laws dealing with the rights of 
consumers in or affecting interstate commerce. Having concluded 
that consumer protection laws are within a potential area of legisla-
tive regulation, it could then be argued that this is a sufficient interest 
to be protected by the assertion of federal-court jurisdiction.89 How-
ever, as previously suggested,00 the constitutionality of this approach 
to protective jurisdiction is suspect. 
The language of S. 1980 seems to obviate the need for an analysis 
of whether there might be cases involving consumer protection that 
would not be amenable to the exercise of congressional lawmaking 
powers.01 If there are specific cases and issues in an area over which 
Congress does not have legislative sway, one could retreat to Professor 
'\Vechsler's latest thesis that protective jurisdiction should obtain 
despite the absence of congressional power to enact substantive law 
for those cases and issues.92 However, this rationale, already subject 
to some question,93 loses much of its force when applied to S. 1980. 
Professor Wechsler was able to rely on the specter of discrimination 
against the residents of the District of Columbia in other state courts 
as the prime example to sustain his position. The Tydings bill, in 
contrast, can be intended only to protect consumers from their own 
state judicial systems.94 
Surely the most obvious theory on which to frame a protective-
88. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
89. See Letter to the Hon. Robert C. Eckhardt from Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr., 
April 30, 1969, reprinted in Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection 
Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23 (1970). Professor Black wrote 
that "[t]he resulting class actions, if your bill is passed, would in the most direct and 
literal sense 'arise under' a law of the United States-namely, your Act, itself passed as 
a measure 'necessary and proper' to the exercise of Congress's power over interstate 
commerce." Id. at 22. While Professor Blad, ad;nowledged that an active federal policy 
already existed in the area of con~unw,· prokllion. his language suggests that he is 
endorsing protective jurisdiction in this case primarily because it is "necessary and 
proper" to an article I power. In this regard, he is approaching very nearly the 
argument made by Justice Jackson in the Tidewater case. See text accompanying note 
20 supra. 
90. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra. 
91. The bill read in part: " .•. (2) Congress finds further that patterns or practices 
which violate Federal and State consumer protection laws affect commerce and that 
interstate commerce will be fostered by providing an effective remedy for violations 
of those laws." S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(2) (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. 
REC. 10,460 (1969). This language indicates that the Congress views the entire area of 
consumer protection as one in which Congress can provide substantive law because 
of the impact of consumer frauds on interstate commerce. 
92. See text accompanying note 63 supra. 
93. See text accompanying note 65 supra. 
94. See 115 CONG. R.Ec. 10,459-60 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
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jurisdiction argument in favor of S. 1980 is that of Professor Mish-
kin.95 Senator Tydings took pains to emphasize that consumer protec-
tion is an area of congressional regulation that is based on a "well 
established Federal policy."96 There have been numerous federal 
legislative enactments in the field of consumer protection,07 thus 
satisfying the prerequisites for protective jurisdiction under the 
Mishkin thesis. 
The more telling question then arises concerning the role of the 
legislative program in the protective-jurisdiction scheme. If one as-
sumes that protective jurisdiction over legislative programs is valid 
only because of the possible interstices of the federal programs in the 
state law suit, the Tydings bill is a less likely candidate for protective 
jurisdiction than the Taft-Hartley Act; but it is a candidate nonethe-
less. Prior to Lincoln M ills98 many issues of federal labor law could 
have arisen in a state law suit brought for violation of a contract 
between an employer and a labor organization.99 There would seem 
to be fewer issues of federal consumer law that might arise in a suit 
brought under state consumer laws. One such issue is that of the pre-
emptive effect of federal consumer legislation upon state consumer 
laws.100 Similarly, the circumstances in which a particular suit arises 
may require a court to resolve a question concerning the consistency 
of state law with federal law. Section 111 (a) of the Truth in Lending 
Act101 expressly leaves in force state laws relating to the disclosure of 
information in connection with credit transactions except to the 
extent that those state laws are inconsistent with the federal regula-
tions. A court might well be obliged to construe the Truth in Lend-
ing Act and decide whether the applicable state law is consistent with 
the Act as so construed. 
In addition to the newer genre of federal consumer protection 
laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act102 and the Fair Packaging and 
95. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. 
96. 115 CONG. REc. 10,460 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
97. See, e.g., the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), 
and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
98. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. 
99. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra. 
100. See Atlantic Ocean Prods., Inc. v. Leth, 292 F. Supp. 615 (D. Ore. 1968). 
Atlantic Ocean Products sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Oregon statute that 
limited the use of the word "halibut" in the sale of certain fish. The plaintiff argued 
that the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), 
had pre-empted this area of regulation. The court ruled that the Act superseded only 
state regulations dealing with the net contents of a package, and added that the state 
statute did not conflict with any decision of the Food and Drug Administration 
pertaining to the classification of halibut. 292 F. Supp. at 618. 
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
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Labeling Act,103 older federal legislation exists that is also designed 
to safeguard the interests of consumers. The Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act104 and the Federal Trade Commission Act105 establish 
federal regulation of significant portions of the consumer market, 
although neither act expressly provides the consumer with a federal 
cause of action for violations of the act. Section 303 of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act authorizes criminal sanctions for any person who 
adulterates or misbrands the specified items in interstate commerce,106 
but the provisions of this Act might become involved in a state cause 
of action, particularly if the latter proceeds upon a theory of neg-
ligence per se.107 The Federal Trade Commission Act gives the Com-
mission the power to order the cessation of "unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in commerce."108 The breadth of "unfair or decep-
tive practices" as interpreted by the Commission and the federal 
courts suggests that the involvement of federal decisional law in a 
state law cause of action is not unlikely.100 Indeed, the importance and 
involvement of federal law in this area can only be enhanced, for 
the second Tydings bill, S. 3092, also provides consumers with a class 
action to vindicate violations of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.110 It is thus likely that federal law would become implicated in 
state consumer actions. The original Tydings bill, therefore, appears 
to satisfy the interstitial requirements of the Mishkin protective-
jurisdiction theory. 
If it is concluded that S. 1980 meets the interstitial test, it follows 
a fortiori that the bill meets the broader test that there be a legislative 
program to be protected in its broad contours. In this regard, it is 
difficult to distinguish the field of consumer protection today from 
that of labor-management relations at the time of the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act.111 If section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act can 
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
104. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-92 (1964). 
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
106. 21 u.s.c. § 333 (1964). 
107. See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960), in which 
the court allowed a civil remedy on a negligence per se theory for a violation of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See also Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, 109 Mont. 213, 95 
P.2d 443 (1939), in which compliance with the federal statute was raised as a defense 
to a damage action. 
108. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964). 
109. See Hearings on Class Action and Other Consumer Protection Procedures 
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1970) (statement of FTC Chairman 
Paul Rand Dixon). 
110. S. 3092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 32,142 
(1969). 
111. See Forrester, supra note 71. 
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arguably be subsumed under the Mishkin thesis,112 it is difficult to see 
why S. 1980 should not likewise be regarded as an appropriate grant 
to the federal courts of the right to exercise protective jurisdiction. 
The objection that can be raised to protective jurisdiction under 
S. 1980, however, is that the ultimate intent of the bill was to bypass, 
and perhaps indirectly to force the reform of, state procedures for 
class actions. It may be questioned whether this is an appropriate 
function for protective jurisdiction. Assuming the constitutional 
validity of the Mishkin thesis of jurisdiction to protect legislative 
programs, critics of protective jurisdiction might still maintain that 
"it is going beyond the fair purport of the Constitution to permit the 
federal judicial system to be used as a means of indirect reform and 
modification of the rules of procedure of the states."113 As applied to 
S. 1980, this criticism may in part be unjustified since it is not clear 
that the purpose of the bill was to force the states to reform their 
procedures for class actions, although this might well be the denoue-
ment. What is clear, however, is that the bill was intended as a means 
to bypass restrictive state class-action procedures.114 Protective juris-
diction would function under S. 1980 not to protect legislative pro-
grams from less sympathetic hearings before state courts;115 rather, it 
would serve to protect state consumers from the procedural rules of 
their own state courts. Such an extension stretches the concept of 
protective jurisdiction beyond that which Professor Mishkin himself 
may have envisioned. 
Whether Mishkin actually did envision that his theory could 
validly be put to such a use is not clear. Admittedly, he was con-
cerned more with the sympathetic application of state law than with 
the failings of state procedure, 116 but he probably was not unaware of 
the fact that many of the proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act viewed 
section 301 as a necessity because restrictive state procedural rules 
made the state courts inadequate forums for the enforcement of labor 
contracts.117 Thus, it is at least arguable that Mishkin's analysis of 
the Taft-Hartley Act in terms of his thesis118 may in fact have been 
an implicit endorsement of the use of federal jurisdiction to protect 
litigants from cumbersome state procedure. 
Conceptually, this extension is not wholly unjustified, for state 
procedural rules could as easily thwart a suit that is supported by a 
strong federal policy as could an unsympathetic hearing before a 
112. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195-96. 
113. Forrester, supra note 71, at 120. 
114. See 115 CONG. REC, 10,459-60 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
115. See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
116. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 184-85, 195-96. 
117. Forrester, supra note 71, at 117-18. 
118. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195-96. 
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state court. If providing the most favorable forum is a legitimate 
function of protective jurisdiction, providing the most favorable 
rules of procedure would appear to be an equally legitimate function. 
Both functions may be necessary to vindicate the federal policy in the 
case. Moreover, providing favorable rules of procedure does not seem 
to be a greater impingement on the state in most cases than providing 
a sympathetic forum. Since the litigation would be shifted to the 
federal courts, the state interests in cost of judicial administration and 
in orderly procedure-two of the most common goals of state pro-
cedural rules-would not be adversely affected. And if the state rule 
is merely the product of the state's failure to revise its procedure 
adequately, the rule should certainly not be sufficient to stand in the 
way of federal protective jurisdiction. Moreover, even if the state 
procedural rule reflects a substantive state policy, the exercise of 
federal protective jurisdiction should still prevail under the suprem-
acy clause of the Constitution.119 Thus, if the Mishkin theory of 
protective jurisdiction is constitutional, its application to S. 1980 
would appear to be justified, as would the further conclusion that 
S. 1980 would have been constitutionally valid. 
The problems of interpretation and perhaps of constitutionality 
presented by S. 1980 have been rendered less obvious by Senator Tyd-
ings' introduction of S. 3092.120 Although S. 3092 is, on its face, a 
bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act, the bill also con-
tains the provisions of the earlier Tydings bill (S. 1980), although in 
a slightly varied form.121 The new bill attempts to confer jurisdiction 
on the federal courts by treating state law as federal law through the 
techniques of adoption and incorporation.122 As already noted,123 the 
objective of the new bill is the same as that of S. 1980: to confer 
federal jurisdiction so that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 will 
be available to consumer-plaintiffs. It may be questioned why Sena-
tor Tydings chose a new approach-incorporation and adoption-in 
S. 3092 to achieve the same objective he sought to achieve in S. 1980 
through protective jurisdiction. 
One suspects that the supporters of this legislation changed the 
theory on which the legislation was based because they feared that 
the bill as first introduced (S. 1980) would not fall within constitu-
tional bounds.124 To be sure, the Mishkin thesis, particularly when 
construed in terms of an interstitial formula, is a constitutionally 
persuasive one; and the original Tydings bill would apparently fall 
119. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
120. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text. 
121. See text accompanying note 7, and note 13 supra. 
122. See note 13 supra. 
123. See text accompanying note 14 supra. 
124. See text acompanying note 15 supra. 
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within that formula despite the fact that the intent of the bill was to 
avoid state procedural rules.125 But it is not certain that the concept 
of protective jurisdiction itself would be upheld by the Supreme 
Court, and at least one well-known commentator is of the opinion 
that the Court would reject the notion as violative of article III 
limitations.126 The question that arises, then, is whether the adoption 
technique can be validly used to accomplish the same end as S. 1980 
would have achieved and at the same time avoid the constitutional 
constraints that would have been imposed on that bill. 
Traditionally, adoption and incorporation have not been used 
to confer federal jurisdiction (and its attendant procedural benefits) 
as an end in itself. Rather, these techniques have been employed to 
achieve broader goals. Perhaps the most notable use of adoption can 
be found in the series of federal assimilative crimes acts.127 In passing 
on one of the earlier assimilative acts, the Supreme Court read as 
congressional intent a "design that the places under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States shall not be freed from the restraints 
of the law .... "128 Congress adopted state law so that some law would 
in fact govern the federal enclave. This goal differs markedly from 
the adoption of state law in order to vest federal-court jurisdiction in 
areas in which state law is already being applied. 
Adoption and incorporation have also been utilized to supple-
ment state laws with federal law. In Griswold v. President of the 
United States,129 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the constitutionality of the Connally Hot Oil Act.130 This Act made 
it a federal crime to ship oil in interstate commerce in excess of 
amounts permitted by state law. It can be argued that the adoption 
technique in S. 3092 is being similarly employed to aid and supple-
ment state consumer laws already in existence. However, the use of 
adoption in the Connally Hot Oil Act and Griswold is distinguishable 
from its use in S. 3092 because in the former case adoption was neces-
sary to assist the states in remedying an abuse that they were otherwise 
at a serious disadvantage in stopping.131 Federal adoption is peculiarly 
appropriate in such circumstances. The same is not true, however, in 
the case in which adoption is used to avoid stringent state procedural 
rules that the states are capable of amending if they so desire. 
Moreover, both the assimilative crimes acts and the Connally Hot 
· 125. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra. 
126. C. WRIGHT, supra note 27, § 20, at 67. 
127. The present Federal Assimilative Crimes Act is codified in 18 U.S.C. § l!l (1964). 
128. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278 (1909). 
129. 82 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1936). 
130, Act of Feb. 22, 1935, ch. 18, 49 Stat. !10, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-15l (1964), 
as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
131. 82 F.2d at 925. 
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Oil Act are clearly distinguishable from S. 3092 in one overriding 
particular. The assimilative crimes acts and the Hot Oil Act were 
both based on a valid legislative purpose that went beyond merely 
confining jurisdiction in federal courts. The purpose of the former 
was to create laws in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction,132 and 
the purpose of the latter was to bring federal law enforcement 
facilities to bear on the proscribed activity.133 The sole purpose be-
hind the adoption in S.3092, however, appears to be the granting of 
federal jurisdiction. When this is so clearly the case, it would seem 
that article III limitations should be operative because the granting 
of federal jurisdiction is expressly limited by that article alone. 
Although adoption may be justified as an exercise of Congress' article 
I powers, the Supreme Court has rejected article I as a basis for ex-
panding federal-court jurisdiction.134 Since the purpose of the adop-
tion in S. 3092 is solely jurisdictional, article III considerations should 
be determinative. Thus, the same arguments for and against the con-
stitutional validity of S. 1980 should apply to S. 3092. 
The use of adoption and incorporation of state law solely as a 
means of providing federal-court jurisdiction should not be coun-
tenanced unless the result is one that can be reached within the 
bounds of a constitutionally valid theory of protective jurisdiction. 
As indicated earlier,135 S. 1980 would probably have fallen within the 
most persuasive of the protective-jurisdiction theories-the Mishkin 
theory. Yet even that theory is subject to serious and as yet totally 
unresolved constitutional questions.136 And in answering those ques-
tions, the Supreme Court would be compelled to undergo an analysis 
of the appropriate limits on federal jurisdiction under article III of 
the Constitution. Since the sole purpose of S. 3092 is jurisdictional, 
that same analysis should be required in determining its constitu-
tionality. 
132. See United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 12 (1911); Western Union 
Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1909). 
133. Griswold v. President of the United States, 82 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1936). 
134. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text. 
135. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text. 
136. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra. 
